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ABSTRACT 
 
Title The Power of Credit Ratings - A study of credit rating 
changes’ effects on essential firm aspects  
Seminar Date                    04 June 2014  
Course                                 FEKH89, degree project undergraduate level, Business 
Administration, 15 university credit points (ECTS) 
Authors                                Fanny Andrea Bjørndalen, Victoria Høgheim, Johanna 
Nilsson and Marielle Svensson 
Advisor                              Tore Eriksson 
Keywords                             Credit ratings, capital structure, financial ratios, valuation, 
performance 
Purpose                                The aim of this study is to empirically examine how a 
change in credit rating affects three specific firm aspects: 
capital structure, valuation and performance. We want to 
extend the scope of previous research by examining whether 
US firms change their capital structure after a change in its 
Broad rating. We will also investigate whether a change in 
firms’ long-term ratings has an effect on firm valuation and 
performance. 
Methodology                        The methodology used in this study is of a deductive, 
quantitative nature. We will investigate the relationship 
between credit ratings and changes in financial ratios using 
multiple linear regression models. 
Theoretical perspectives The theoretical framework of this study is based on main 
theories on capital structure and other firm aspects, as well 
as previous research on credit ratings and their impact on 
financial ratios.  
Empirical Foundation This study’s empirical investigations are based on historical 
data from Standard & Poor’s long-term issuer rating and 
firms’ financial information on a sample of 77 firms. The 
data collected covers a five-year period from 2009-2013, 
which amounts to a total of 385 firm-years. 
Conclusions The findings of this study support the hypothesis that credit 
rating changes affect firms’ capital structure decisions. 
Further, the results indicate that credit rating changes do not 
have a statistically significant impact on valuation and 
performance. These findings are evident for large cap firms 
on the US market and might be explained by the 
characteristics of our data sample. According to this study, 
the trade-off theory outweighs the CR-CS and TTCR 
hypotheses.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
             
 
The introductory chapter introduces the background to the topic of our study. We will 
present a problem discussion that leads to a formulation of research questions, followed 
by the study’s aim and objectives. The chapter concludes with a description of the target 
group to which this essay is addressed and ends with a disposition. 
             
 
1.1 Background to the study 
Partnoy (1999) quotes a famous interview with Thomas Friedman who emphasizes the 
importance of credit rating agencies. He compares the power they possess with the power 
of The United States as a superpower. This accentuates the critical role that credit ratings 
have played in the progress of the development of financial markets (Partnoy, 1999). 
 
”…The United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody’s can destroy you 
by downgrading your bonds. And believe me, it’s not clear sometimes who’s more 
powerful.” –Thomas Friedman, 1996 
(Partnoy, 1999:620) 
 
Credit ratings measure the debtor's ability and likelihood to pay back debt as well as the 
firm’s risk of default (Partnoy, 1999; Ogden et al, 2003). The history of credit rating 
agencies dates back to 1909 when John Moody was first to publish credit ratings of a 
range of firms. In 1916 Poor’s Publishing followed with their credit ratings and a couple 
of years later came Standard Statistics and Fitch, publishing their first ratings in 1922 and 
1924, respectively. With a slightly different arrangement, Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s 
and Fitch are still the greatest credit rating agencies in the market today (White, 2007). 
Standard and Poor’s is the leading agency and rates government and corporate debt to a 
value of $2 trillion (Partnoy, 1999). 
 
The rating agencies add market value and help reduce information asymmetry by using 
public as well as confidential and firm specific information in their rating processes 
(Partnoy, 1999; Grunert et al, 2005). Firms are ranked according to their relative 
creditworthiness and ability to pay back debt, which in turn motivates the pricing of 
different kinds of debt such as corporate bonds. 
 
Credit rating agencies are dependent on their trustworthiness and therefore need to 
exercise caution in their rating processes. The agencies must be careful with giving firms 
excessive high grades to avoid a weakened reputation and a risk of losing future errands 
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(Partnoy, 1999). When Enron and Worldcom faced difficulties in the beginning of the 21st 
century, neither Standard & Poor nor Moody’s chose to downgrade the firms until the 
stocks crashed. This became a well-known event in the market and endangered the rating 
agencies’ credibility (Güttler et al, 2007; White, 2007). To address the credibility issues, 
objectivity and independence are essential guiding principles that credit rating agencies 
should build their operations on. 
 
Until 1970 credit rating agencies were hired by investors to assess firms’ financial strength 
and be given credit ratings. However, this has changed and today the respective firm hires 
and pays the agencies to rate their company (Partnoy, 1999). This can be seen as a major 
reform in the industry that may have entailed consequences for the agencies’ 
independency. Due to this, the legislation has changed over time, sought to improve the 
business of credit ratings (Partnoy, 1999; White, 2007). According to Partnoy (1999), the 
fact that firms today pay the costs associated with credit ratings could be one of the 
reasons for the great expansion in the industry. However, the risk of potential conflicts of 
interest has increased. An agency might be tempted to rate a firm with a higher grade in 
exchange for a larger compensation (White, 2007). This would in turn have a negative 
impact on the industry since investors would not be able to rely on the ratings. During the 
last 15 years, national regulatory categories and legislations, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act from 2002, have been implemented in order to control the agencies and ensure fair 
credit ratings (White, 2007). 
 
One of the most essential financial decisions firms undertake is determining their capital 
structure. Moreover, it includes deciding how much long-term debt and equity capital to 
issue (Ogden et al., 2003). Credit ratings are the second highest concern when CFOs 
determine their firm’s capital structure, according to a study conducted by Graham and 
Harvey in 2001. As much as 57.1% of the CFOs questioned found credit ratings to be 
essential when issuing debt (Graham and Harvey, 2001). Other important features of a 
firm are valuation and performance, however these are not as easy for management to 
influence as capital structure decisions. Credit ratings can also affect these aspects of the 
firm by strengthening future outlook. 
 
Credit rating agencies, and ratings overall, play an important role in todays business 
environment and financial markets. With a history that stretches over a century, they have 
become a utility not only for stakeholders such as investors and lenders, but also for firms 
themselves in their capital structure decisions. Previous research conducted in the field has 
revealed a significant relationship between credit ratings and various financial ratios. 
Distinguished relationships can also be drawn to well-known financial theories such as the 
Modigliani and Miller theorem of capital structure, in addition to the trade-off and pecking 
order theories. Although these theories explain some of the reasons for capital structure 
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decisions, they do not consider all relevant factors that affect capital structure. Thus, 
implying that the field is not yet fully investigated (Kronwald, 2009). 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
Previous studies have confirmed credit ratings’ impact on firms’ capital structure 
decisions. An empirical research conducted by Ogden et al (2003) examined how changes 
in credit ratings in the late 1990s lead to changes in three certain financial variables; sales 
growth, debt ratio and market equity value. The results revealed that firms that had 
undergone a rating upgrade experienced increased sales growth and market equity value, 
but a decrease in debt ratio. Firms that had been downgraded experienced the reverse; 
decreased sales growth, a fall in market equity value but an increase in debt ratio (Ogden 
et al, 2003). Ogden et al (2003) further developed this study, concluding that eight specific 
financial ratios were affected by changes in credit ratings. 
 
In another study, Kisgen (2006) found that capital structure decisions are directly affected 
by credit ratings. The focus of this study was how companies close to an upgrade or 
downgrade changed their issuance of debt and equity. In contrast, Ogden et al’s (2003) 
study examined the results after a rating change. The results in Kisgen’s study showed that 
firms close to an upgrade or downgrade are reluctant to take on additional debt. These 
firms issued approximately 1% less net debt relative to net equity. Michelsen and Klein 
did a similar, refined study in 2011 with an international perspective in the period of 1990 
to 2008. This confirmed Kisgen’s previous study but showed an even more distinct 
decrease in the firms net debt issuance by 1.8%. Kisgen (2009) extended his research on 
credit ratings by examining capital structure decisions after a Broad rating change1. He 
found that downgraded firms issue less debt relative to equity, while an upgrade led to 
more debt issuance. These findings were more significant for lower rated firms, therefore 
it is of interest to examine whether the opposite relationship exists with large and higher 
rated firms. 
 
By combining the findings from Ogden et al and Kisgen, we would like to determine if a 
change in a firm’s credit rating affects its capital structure, as well as the effect on 
financial ratios. In contrast to Kisgen (2006), but similar to Kisgen (2009), we want to 
examine how capital structure decisions are affected after an actual change has occurred. 
Since credit ratings also affect other aspects of the firm, it is interesting to examine the 
effect ratings have on other features like valuation and performance. While Ogden et al 
(2003) studied how credit rating changes affected sales growth, debt ratio and market 
equity value, we are interested in looking at the effect changes in credit ratings have on net 
debt issuance, market-to-book and return on assets. These ratios relate to capital structure, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  A rating change from one category to another 	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valuation and performance, respectively. The ratios Ogden et al (2003) used also reflect 
these three aspects, but while management can control the debt ratio, it is more difficult 
for a firm to control sales growth and market equity value. Our ratios on the other hand, 
are more controllable than Ogden et al’s (2003). A firm can regulate their net debt 
issuance, and it has more power over its market-to-book and return on assets compared to 
its market equity value and sales growth. Since a company has more control over all the 
ratios we have chosen, they are easier to compare to each other. To the extent of our 
knowledge, this will be the first paper to examine how firms that have experienced a 
change in their Broad rating also exhibit a change in capital structure, valuation and 
performance. 
 
1.3 Research Question 
In order to determine if a change in credit rating leads to a change in a firm’s financial 
ratios, the following research questions have been formulated: 
 
1. Do firms change their capital structure by issuing more debt in relation to equity 
after a Broad rating change? 
 
2.  Does a Broad rating change affect other firm aspects like valuation and 
profitability? 
 
1.4 Aim and objectives 
The aim of our study is to extend the scope of previous research by examining whether US 
firms experience a change in firm aspects after a change in its Broad rating. This study 
will emphasize on the effect credit ratings have on firms’ capital structure, but we will 
also investigate the effect on companies’ valuation and performance. 
 
Our study is based on previous research from primarily three articles: Kisgen (2006; 2009) 
as well as Ogden et al (2003). Kisgen (2006) introduces the CR-CS hypothesis, which 
states that the impact of credit rating modifications directly affect capital structure 
decision making, and that companies near a change in rating issue less net debt than 
companies not close to the same change. In 2009 Kisgen extended his research by 
examining actual changes in credit ratings. Ogden et al (2003) did another type of 
research, testing which financial ratios that are most affected by credit ratings. Since these 
studies already have been conducted, we want to focus our study on how firms’ capital 
structure, valuation and performance are affected after an actual change in Broad rating. 
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1.5 Scope and limitations 
The purpose of this study is to examine how a change in credit rating affects three specific 
financial ratios. The ratios we will test are (1) net debt issuance, (2) market-to-book ratio 
and (3) return on assets. These ratios reflect a firm’s capital structure, valuation and 
performance, respectively. The sample used in our study is based on US firms from the 
S&P 500 list, with ratings from the time period 2009-2013. We will examine the 
previously mentioned relationship between present and historical elements of 77 US firms, 
equivalent to 385 firm-years (see Appendix I). All of the companies presented in our 
sample are part of S&P 500 and rated during the entire time period of our study. The 
credit ratings data used is Standard & Poor’s long-term domestic issuer rating, which 
according to Kisgen (2006) represents the corporate credit rating. The study will address a 
time period of five years after the previous financial crisis, a period that to our knowledge 
has not yet been researched. In chapter 3 the selection procedures and criteria will be 
discussed in more detail. 
 
1.6 Target group 
This study is aimed mainly to researchers and students who are interested in finance, and 
in the relationship between credit ratings and their effect on capital structure, valuation 
and performance in particular. Furthermore our study can be of interest for firms with an 
existing credit rating, as they can use this information to examine how their credit rating is 
connected to their financial ratios.  
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1.7 Disposition 
 
Theory                                 This chapter seeks to outline existing and relevant theories 
for the field of our study. We present S&P’s evaluation 
process as well as the MM theorem of capital structure, an 
important basis for the trade-off theory as well as the 
pecking order theory. We will also present previous research 
and their findings in order to find possible drawbacks to our 
research questions. 
 
Methodology                        In this chapter we will describe our approach and choice of 
methodology used in this study. Furthermore, we will 
explain the sample method and the variables applied in the 
study. 
 
Results                                  In the following chapter we will present the results from our 
regressions. Further, the hypotheses tests and the model of 
fit will be examined. 
 
Analysis                         In this chapter we will analyze the results based on the 
theoretical framework presented earlier in our study. Our 
aim is to first analyze the effects of credit rating on capital 
structure decisions, followed be its effect on other important 
firm aspects. Finally, we will outline relevant limitations 
that might have affected our results. 
 
Conclusion                            The final chapter will present the conclusions of our study, 
in addition to suggestions for further research within the 
field. 
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2. THEORIES & PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
            
                                                      
This chapter seeks to outline existing and relevant theories for the field of our study. We 
present S&P’s evaluation process as well as the MM theorem of capital structure, an 
important basis for the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory. We will also present 
previous research and their findings in order to find possible drawbacks to our research 
questions. 
             
 
 
2.1 S&P’s Evaluation Process 
One of the most fundamental criteria for the existence of credit rating companies is their 
credibility to outside investors. To achieve trust in the market, rating agencies need to 
fulfill the criteria of reputational capital2 (Partnoy, 1999): 
 
1. The rating companies must have reputational capital at stake when certifying the 
issuing corporation. 
2. The loss of reputational capital must exceed the gain possible from false 
certification. 
3. The ratings services must be costly, and this cost must be related to the asymmetric 
information associated with the issuing firm. 
(Partnoy, 1999:628) 
 
The last financial crisis revealed that rating agencies had much to improve to restore 
confidence in their ratings. Standard and Poor’s has taken several initiatives to better its 
transparency and quality in its grade-setting processes (S&P, 2009). The company has a 
long experience in the field, but to maintain its strong position S&P must preserve its 
trustworthiness in the market (Partnoy, 1999; S&P, 2008). To provide a greater 
transparency S&P has, for example, published “what-if” analyses examining factors that 
might cause a change in ratings and changes made to rating criteria. Standard and Poor’s 
believes that actions, like publishing the “what-if“ analysis as well as other significant 
information, will help the market to better understand the ratings, and act on them if they 
agree with the given information (S&P, 2009). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 A reserve of good will, on which other parties rely in transacting with that individual. Reputational 
Capital leads parties to include trust as a factor in their decision-making; trust enables parties to reduce the 
costs of reaching agreement.” (Partnoy, 1999, p. 628) 	  
	  	   8 
Standard & Poor’s corporate credit rating is their forward-looking opinion on the issuer’s 
fundamental creditworthiness (S&P, 2009). An important note is that a corporate rating is 
not a reflection of priority or preference among the evaluated obligations, but foremost an 
opinion on the financial condition (S&P, 2008). The rating reflects the issuer’s capacity 
and disposition to assemble its financial obligations on time. Hence, the primary factor 
when rating issuers and obligations is the likelihood of default. The credit rating also 
reflects the issuer’s payment priority, recovery and credit stability (S&P, 2009). 
 
The investment grades that S&P assigns are categorized into two groups, investment grade 
and speculative grade. The highest rating that can be attained is the AAA rating, a grade 
that is given solely to a few companies in an exceptionally strong financial state, with a 
solid capacity to meet obligations on time. This rating is regarded an investment grade, 
along with ratings AA, A and BBB (Ogden et al., 2003). The investment group reflects 
issuers and obligations that have at least an adequate capacity to meet their commitments. 
The lowest rating given is a D, which is given when a company is in default. Along with 
ratings BB, B, CCC, CC and C, the D rating is considered a speculative grade (S&P, 
2014). An overview can be found in table 1. The issuers with speculative grades face 
ongoing uncertainties, which can lead to an insufficient capacity to meet their financial 
obligations. Standard & Poor’s also assigns modifiers to the ratings to indicate whether the 
issuer is strong or weak within the appointed grade. The modifiers are given by the signs 
(+) or (-). The rating NR (Not Rated) characterizes that S&P’s does not rate the specific 
issuer or that the issuer cannot be rated due to inadequate information (Ogden et al., 
2003). 
Table 1: Credit ratings definitions 
      
S&P credit ratings definitions 
 
Credit rating Capacity to meet financial commitments 
 
AAA Extremely strong 
 
AA Very strong 
Investment grade A Strong 
 
BBB Adequate 
 BBB- Considered lowest investment grade rating 
 
BB+ Considered highest speculative grade rating 
 
BB Vulnerable 
Speculative grade B More vulnerable 
 
CCC/C Extremely vulnerable 
 D In default 
Note: Ratings from AA to CCC may be modified by the addition of a plus (+) or minus (-) sign to show 
relative standing within the major rating categories. BB+/BBB- is only presented to determine the division 
between investment and speculative grade. 
Source: Standard & Poor’s, 2014 
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According to Kisgen (2006) there are three different ways to measure credit ratings (see 
figure 1 below). In addition to investment grade and speculative grade rating, Kisgen 
(2006) also divides ratings into Broad ratings and Micro ratings. While Micro rating is the 
plus, middle or minus within a certain rating, Broad rating classifies the ratings as the 
general letter, e.g. B, BB, or A. This study will focus on changes in Broad ratings. 
                             
Figure 1: Three types of rating changes 
 
2.2 Main theories  
 
2.2.1 Capital structure 
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) propositions on capital structure was one of the first 
theories explaining a firm’s capital structure choice, and the MM theorem3 still infiltrates 
almost all aspects of financial economics today. In their seminal work from 1958, 
Modigliani and Miller proved that in theory neither capital structure nor dividend policy 
affect a firm’s value. They argue that the right action is to try to maximize the value of the 
company, and that a certain capital structure or dividend policy is irrelevant for the 
shareholders. Further they conclude that, under certain restrictive assumptions, a firm’s 
value should be independent of its capital structure. In 1963, however, the realization of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Modigliani & Miller’s main assumptions are: 
! Financial markets are perfect and without friction	  
! There are no taxes	  
! Firms can only issue two types of securities; equity and risk-free debt	  
! There are no default risks	  
! There are no transaction costs	  
! Both firms and investors have the same information	  
! The firm management acts exclusively on the behalf of stockholders	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tax advantages of debt financing led Modigliani and Miller to conclude that the capital 
structure is relevant to the total value of the firm. 
 
As Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) points out, the Modigliani and Miller thesis does not 
hold in practice as the market has imperfections. In order to get to a theoretical framework 
that better reflects the real-world market situation, these assumptions needed to be re-
worked. As a consequence, two main theories explaining how firms determine their 
capital structure have emerged, namely the trade-off theory (Myers, 1984) and the pecking 
order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
 
2.2.2 Trade-off theory 
Myers (1984) introduced the trade-off theory as one of two ways of thinking about capital 
structure. The trade-off theory of capital structure explains how corporations usually are 
financed partially with debt and partially with equity. In the trade-off model the value of a 
company is maximized through the balance between costs and benefits associated with 
debt and equity financing. In order to attain an optimal capital structure that maximizes 
their total market value, a firm has to pursue debt levels that balance the value of interest 
tax shields to the various costs of bankruptcy or financial distress. Figure 2 illustrates how 
the trade-off theory of capital structure works and how a firm seeks to achieve an optimal 
balance between debt and equity. 
 
 
Figure 2: The trade-off theory of capital structure 
 
 
 Source: Myers, 1984, p. 577 
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The benefits of leverage include tax advantages and the reduction of free cash flow 
problems. The costs associated with debt involves cost of financial distress or bankruptcy 
and agency costs, in addition to the actual cost of holding debt because of interest 
payments (Fama and French, 2002). 
 
2.2.3 Pecking order theory 
The pecking order theory was developed by Myers and Majluf (1984), and seeks to 
explain a firm’s priorities of financing. The theory takes a different approach on capital 
structure decisions by including the assumptions of asymmetrical information as an 
aggravating factor. As a consequence of this asymmetrical information, companies follow 
a certain pecking order when determining their capital structure (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
The basis of the pecking order theory is that firms prefer internal funds rather than 
external funds, and debt before equity, as this is the most expensive way of financing. 
According to Kronwald (2009) managers have an incentive to issue equity when the firm 
is overvalued, and investors will take this into account when investing. As a result, the 
cost of equity increases and debt becomes a more preferable option. 
 
2.3 Previous research 
2.3.1 The Significance of Credit Ratings on Financial Ratios 
Several previous studies examine the subject of how credit ratings and different financial 
measurements are incorporated with each other. A relationship between capital structure, 
financial ratios and credit ratings was determined as early as in the 1960’s when Horrigan 
(1966) published a study regarding the relationship between credit ratings and financial 
ratios.  
 
Horrigan (1966) used a sample of US firms that all had bonds rated by S&P during the 
significant period he tested. The dependent variable in the study was credit ratings, based 
on a previous study by Hickman in 1958. Hickman had found credit ratings to be good 
estimators on default risk. Horrigan found the dependent variable, the credit rating, 
challenging since it is based on different factors, which include raters’ own opinions. 
Horrigan used total assets and other key ratios as independent variables. Horrigan believed 
that the largest interest in long-term credit administration was the issuers’ capacity to 
repay its long-term debt. The hypotheses in the study generally implied that high ratings 
were given to: 
 
“...large firms whose long-term solvency ratios are high, whose profit-margin and return-
on-investment ratios are higher than the industry average, and whose capital-turnover 
ratios are close to the industry average” 
 (Horrigan, 1966: 52) 
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The test results proved that there were simple correlations between the independent 
variable and the ratings. This proved financial ratios to be useful when determining 
corporate ratings (Horrigan, 1966). West (1970) criticized Horrigan for not basing his 
hypotheses on theoretical studies or at least explanations to why he developed the 
hypotheses in such manner. He also believed Horrigan’s study to rely too heavily on one 
year’s financial data in ratio form to predict ratings. Therefore Fisher (1959) had a better 
study since he linked risk premiums to default risks, and thereby to marketability. West 
found Fisher’s model more empirically based and thoroughly rationalized. Fisher’s model 
was based on more historical numbers and not on a certain year’s ratios. One year’s 
financial data cannot either predict variability in a firm’s income. Therefore historical 
numbers give a better understanding of the default risk. Despite this, Horrigan’s model 
had an advantage in the easiness of calculating the ratios, and West concluded that 
Horrigan’s model was slightly better based on the easiness of calculation (West, 1970). 
 
More recently, an empirical research was conducted by Ogden et al (2003), which 
investigated the determinants of S&P’s ratings during a period between 1996 and 1999. 
Specifically the study consisted of five empirical analyses, each with slightly different 
objectives. The first investigated whether certain financial characteristics can be 
recognized given a firm’s level of rating. To further extend this analysis, Ogden et al 
(2003) examined to what extent rating variation can be explained by financial variables. 
The understanding was deepened through testing the ratings’ stability over time, which 
drew attention to historical changes in Broad rating. The results indicated that, during the 
time period tested, ratings changed relatively frequent and only about one third had 
maintained the same rating throughout the whole period. Of the firms that had undergone 
a change, a slightly higher proportion had been downgraded compared to the proportion 
that had been upgraded. 
 
The next step in Ogden et al’s (2003) analysis was to look more closely into the firms that 
had undergone an actual change in their rating during the period, and examine whether 
these firms had also experienced any essential changes in their financial structure. Three 
certain financial variables were analyzed: sales growth, debt ratio and market equity value. 
For each number of changes a firm had undergone, an average for the measurements was 
calculated. The study revealed that there was in fact a significant relationship between 
credit ratings and financial ratios. Firms that had experienced upgrades generally also 
experienced higher sales growth and increased market equity value, as well as a reduction 
of their debt ratio. For a downgrade the reverse relation occurred, i.e. increased debt ratios, 
and fall in sales growth and market equity values. The last analysis that was conducted 
examined the effects macroeconomic factors have on bond rating in general. This analysis 
investigated the years 1985-1999. Average changes in rating were compared to GDP 
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growth, which revealed a significant increase in ratings during the recession of 1990-1991, 
followed by a decrease in ratings when the economy recovered.  
 
2.3.2 The Significance of Credit Ratings on Capital Structure 
Kisgen (2006) examined the influence of credit ratings on a firm’s capital structure 
decisions, although his focus was slightly different than ours. Kisgen focused on firms that 
were near a change in rating, and he argued that there are discrete costs (benefits) 
associated with different credit rating levels. Kisgen (2006) proposed the Credit Rating–
Capital Structure hypothesis (CR-CS), which states that credit ratings are important in 
capital structure decisions. The hypothesis also states that firms will undertake less debt if 
close to a change in rating. Therefore, the CR-CS hypothesis argues that firms near a 
change in rating are more likely to undertake debt-reducing activities compared to firms 
that are not close to a change in credit rating. As previously mentioned, Kisgen (2006) 
discovered that firms near a rating change issue 1% less debt to equity. 
 
Kisgen (2006) proposed several motives behind the discrete costs and benefits, as well as 
the evidence that credit ratings affect a firm’s capital structure decision. These arguments 
also support his CR-CS hypothesis:  
 
1.      Regulations on Investments 
Numerous regulations on financial corporations are, according to Kisgen, directly 
tied to credit ratings. Cantor and Packer (1994) suggest that credit rating agencies 
extend financial regulators in overseeing the financial and capital markets. Banks, 
mutual funds, insurance companies, private pensions and security firms have 
increased their reliance on credit ratings since the ratings reflect the financial 
health of the specific firm. For example, many pension funds are not allowed to 
invest in speculative grade bonds (Partnoy, 1999). 
 
2.      Information Complexity of Ratings 
Credit rating agencies receive information on a firm’s quality and financial health 
that other public stakeholders may not have. For instance, credit rating agencies 
may also be specialized in gathering and evaluating information. Therefore they 
have an advantage in being more reliable in examining a firm’s credit rating. In 
other words, the ratings are based on both public and private information. 
 
3.      Costs Directly Imposed on the Firm 
There are direct costs associated with different rating levels. Firm operations are 
affected by its credit rating such as access to other financial instruments i.e. 
commercial papers and bond covenants. These might contain rating triggers, which 
can cause a forced repurchase or changes in coupon rates (Kisgen, 2006). 
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2.4 Credit Ratings in the Context of Existing Capital Structure Theories 
 
2.4.1 CR-CS and the Trade-off theory 
Kisgen (2006) argued that the CR-CS hypothesis complements the traditional theories of 
capital structure by explaining differences in leverage from the debt level suggested by the 
trade-off and pecking order theories. CR-CS states that different credit rating levels are 
associated with discrete costs (benefits) to the firm. In some cases, the costs related to a 
rating change may result in a capital structure behavior that differs from what the 
traditional trade-off theory implies. In contrast to the trade-off theory, CR-CS argues that 
firms regardless of their credit rating will issue less debt when they are close to a change 
in credit rating. In other cases, the trade-off theory factors may offset the credit rating 
concerns, depending on how near the firm is to a credit rating change. Kisgen’s arguments 
are further illustrated in figure 3 A-E. 
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Figure 3: Firm value with trade-off and credit rating effects 
 
 
 
Source: Kisgen, 2006, p. 1042 
 
Figure 3 shows the firm value as a function of leverage, and illustrates the balance of costs 
suggested by the trade-off theory and CR-CS hypothesis. Figure 3A illustrates the 
situation when a firm does not experience any discrete costs related to their credit rating. 
T* signifies the optimal capital structure according to the trade-off theory. This is the 
point where the overall firm value is maximized in the case of no discrete costs (benefits) 
associated with credit rating changes. 
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Figures B-E illustrates different situations where discrete costs (benefits) of credit rating 
changes exist. Panel 3B shows the situation where a firm experiences that the CR-CS 
factors offset the trade-off theory. In situations where a firm is close to a potential rating 
change, they will maximize the overall value by issuing less debt relative to equity than 
the trade-off theory implies, in order to either prevent a downgrade or to obtain an 
upgrade. T* indicates the optimal leverage level according to trade-off theory factors, 
while C* shows the new optimum level where the firm value is maximized by including 
the effect of discrete costs (benefits). 
 
In panels C and D the trade-off theory outweigh the CR-CS hypothesis. The discrete costs 
will not be considered significant in managers’ capital structure decisions if T* relates to a 
credit rating where the risk of potential downgrade (C) or upgrade (D) is low. Hence, the 
cost of moving too far from the optimal debt level (T*) by issuing less debt in order to 
obtain an upgrade will offset the cost of a lower rating. Finally, figure 3E illustrates the 
discontinuous relationship between firm value and leverage caused by discrete costs for 
several credit rating levels. In this figure, T* shows the optimal leverage based merely on 
trade-off theory factors, while C* indicates the optimal level including the effect of credit 
ratings. 
 
2.4.2 CR-CS and the Pecking order theory 
According to the pecking order theory, firms will choose to finance projects with debt 
rather than equity. This reasoning is based on information asymmetry costs that make 
equity more costly than debt (Myers, 1984). A company will first prefer to use internal 
funds when financing investments, then issue debt and as a last resort it will issue equity. 
Debt increases if the investment costs exceed internal funds, but decreases if the 
investment costs are less than the available internal funds. Hence, short-term variations in 
earnings and investments have an effect on short-term leverage. CR-CS argues that 
because of a credit rating change, a discrete cost (benefit) will be sustained based on a 
change in the level of leverage. If pecking order and CR-CS costs for some level of 
leverage are substantial, the cost of issuing equity and the cost of a change in rating will 
balance each other out. Therefore, in contrast to the pecking order theory, some firms near 
an upgrade will issue more equity to attain a higher rating. Meanwhile, firms near a 
possible downgrade may want to issue less debt to avoid the costs associated with a 
downgrade (Kisgen, 2006). 
 
2.4.3 Further research 
Michelsen & Klein (2011) conducted a similar research based on Kisgen’s study from 
2006. They wanted to refine Kisgen’s research and provide a more specific test on the 
relationship between credit ratings and capital structure. Michelsen & Klein (2011) 
complemented Kisgen’s work by adding S&P’s rating outlook as a further representation 
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of a change in rating. By testing companies rated by S&P in the period of 1990-2008, they 
found that firms with a negative outlook on their issuer rating issue 1.8% less debt than 
equity in the succeeding year compared to steady firms. A firm’s credit rating outlook is 
affected by their performance and confidence in their future growth. Therefore, 
performance is a firm aspect that is relevant to examine when studying credit rating 
changes. 
 
Kemper and Rao (2013) criticize Kisgen’s study from 2006. First, they argue that there are 
other factors that affect credit ratings besides leverage, and mention performance and 
quality of assets as examples. Therefore companies may use other instruments than 
leverage to try to affect their credit ratings, like operating cost changes and asset 
reconstructions. Their findings also give little support to the CR-CS method and conclude 
that it may only apply to firms with a risk of receiving a speculative grade. Hence, 
Kisgen’s original results seem to be determined by the subsample of firms with very low 
ratings. The findings of Kemper and Rao (2013) show that firms close to a downgrade 
issue 0.3% less debt to equity. However, they discuss that firms’ financing behavior, when 
close to a downgrade, can be explained by lack of access to the debt market rather than a 
deliberate strategic move to strengthen its position and thereby keep a rating. Further, 
companies near a rating upgrade do not show any changed debt issuing patterns. This 
result differs from Kisgen’s findings.  
 
Kisgen (2009) investigated how changes in credit ratings affect a firm’s subsequent capital 
structure decisions. Kisgen (2009) found that firms whose credit rating gets downgraded 
subsequently reduce their leverage, while firms that are upgraded subsequently increase 
their leverage. He further conducted tests to identify the effects of credit ratings, including 
changes in a firm’s leverage, performance and bankruptcy as additional explanatory 
variables for capital structure behavior. His tests proved that the effect of a downgrade is 
larger at downgrades to a speculative grade rating, and that rating upgrades do not affect 
subsequent capital structure activity. Furthermore, he found that downgraded firms issue 
1.5%-2.0% less debt to equity in the following year. Kisgen (2009) further introduced the 
TTCR theory, which is how the trade-off theory and credit rating effects together imply 
that firms will balance the trade-off benefits of high leverage against the benefits of lower 
leverage and the discrete credit rating benefits of lower leverage. Although his study is 
very similar to our focus, we do not put emphasis on his method. 
 
2.5 Credit Ratings in the Context of The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The theory of efficient markets was introduced by Eugene Fama in 1970, and has played a 
significant role in the area of financial economics. According to Fama (1970) the market’s 
primary role is to allocate the ownership of the economy’s share capital, where the prices 
provide perfect signals for allocation of resources. The prices on an efficient market 
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should at all times fully reflect all available information. This means that, according to 
Fama (1970), as soon as new information is available the market will react and the stock 
prices will automatically stabilize at a new equilibrium. A credit rating change would 
definitely be assumed as new information on the market, which is why it is interesting to 
examine how this affects the market’s valuation of a firm after a rating change. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
             
 
In this chapter we will describe our approach and choice of methodology used in this 
study. Furthermore, we will explain the sample method and the variables applied in the 
study. 
             
 
3.1 Methodological approach 
The methodological approach of our study is based on previous research and existing 
theories, which is why we will take on a deductive approach (Jacobsen, 2002). As our 
objective is to analyze quantitative data and identify causal relations between credit 
ratings and capital structure as well as valuation and performance, our study adopts a 
quantitative approach. A quantitative method is appropriate in research based on 
measurements of a large sample with the intention of testing a hypothesis (Lundahl & 
Skärvad, 1999). The aim of this study is to examine hypotheses to determine the effect on 
capital structure and also apply his method on valuation and performance, based on a 
sample of data from 77 firms, which is why a quantitative approach is suitable. 
 
Some criticism has been directed against research based on a deductive approach. 
Jacobsen’s (2002) opinion is that the approach as such may be limiting and contains an 
imminent risk of neglecting important information and data. There is a possibility that our 
sample is too small or includes too few variables, which might limit our results. To avoid 
the problem, we have conducted a thorough review of previous research and work closely 
related to existing theories. We have also used reliable sources to support our study. 
 
3.2 Reliability and validity 
3.2.1 Reliability 
Reliability is of high importance in all scientific studies and replicability is a concept that 
is often related to reliability. This implies that the results or findings from an investigation 
should, provided high reliability, be exactly the same if the study was carried out again 
(Bryman & Bell, 2007). Reliability is also about making sure that the results are not being 
influenced by errors in the sample such as irregular data, outliers and temporary or random 
differences (Lundahl & Skärvad, 1999; Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
 
To increase the reliability in our investigation we have been careful in the choice of which 
sources to use in the data collection. We have used trustworthy and, in the context of 
corporate finance, recognized sources such as S&P Capital IQ and Thomson Reuters 
Eikon to gather our information. Both databases are used regularly by academic 
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researchers as well as by professional practitioners in the field. Using these databases was 
considered necessary to access the information required for this study. The financial data 
that is gathered from Capital IQ and Eikon is derived from financial information from the 
individual firms. This means the data is reliable and has been reviewed and approved by 
auditors. As a consequence we believe there is a high reliability in the data collected. 
 
We are well aware that even these sources contain a risk of having errors in the data, 
which is why the reliability of this research has been strengthened in several ways. First 
we chose a time period of five years (2009-2013) in order to extend the scope of data and 
minimize the irregularity of information available. Finally, our sample of firms included in 
the study is shown as a compilation in Appendix 1 in order to increase the ability of 
replication. 
 
3.2.2 Validity 
In addition to high reliability, a high level of validity is of great importance when doing 
research. Bryman & Bell (2007) argue that the validity of a research might be of even 
greater importance than the reliability. Validity can be described as the extent to which the 
method applied in the study measures what it is supposed to measure (Bryman & Bell, 
2007). Furthermore, validity can be defined as the absence of systematic errors in the 
measurements (Lundahl & Skärvad, 1999). Lundahl & Skärvad (1999) distinguishes 
between two different types of validity: internal and external validity. Internal validity 
exists when there is a causal relationship between the variables being measured. This 
means that the proposed independent variable is the variable causing the changes in the 
dependent variable (Bryman & Bell, 2007). The financial ratios we are using are well 
developed and thereby supports that our research has a high internal validity. External 
validity, on the other hand, concerns the results and whether they can be generalized 
beyond the particular context being researched (Bryman & Bell, 2007). We developed 
thorough sample criteria in order to present a true and meaningful depiction of the S&P 
500 list. The S&P 500 list consists only of large cap firms, which can be a disadvantage 
when examining credit ratings since most of these firms have a high credit rating. 
Although we believe our sample represents the US market well, we recognize the 
difficulties in generalizing results. 
 
3.3 Sample and sampling method 
As basis for our sample we used all companies listed on S&P 500. The S&P 500 list 
consists of 500 large cap firms that are all traded on US stock markets. The years of 2009-
2013 were chosen as the time period of our study since we wanted an up to date analysis 
that had not yet been researched. The elimination process of companies contained criteria 
listed in figure 4.  
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Figure 4: Sampling procedure 
      
 
    
First step Second step Third step  Fourth step  Fifth step Sixth step 
Selected all 
firms 
present on 
S&P 500 
rated in the 
period of 
2009-2013 
→ 500 
firms 
Excluded 
financial 
corporations
, a total of 
87 
companies 
excluded → 
414 firms 
Excluded 
firms not 
relevant 
because of a 
takeover, 
merger or 
delisting, a 
total of 31 
companies 
excluded → 
383 firms 
Excluded 
firms not 
rated during 
all the years 
of our 
analysis, a 
total of 76 
companies 
excluded → 
307 firms 
Excluded 
firms with 
headquarter
s outside the 
US, a total 
of 5 
companies 
→ 302 
firms 
Excluded 
firms that 
did not 
undergo a 
Broad rating 
change 
between 
2009-2013, 
a total of 
225 
companies 
→ 77 firms 
 
 
First, we selected all current as well as historical S&P 500 corporations in the period of 
2009-2013. A period of five years gives us enough basis to draw safe conclusions and 
limit the effect of the financial crisis, as this could give misleading results. If we had 
chosen a longer period, we would risk losing a large number of observations in our sample 
since the companies need to be rated during the whole time period. Second, we excluded 
all financial corporations on the S&P 500 list from our sample. We eliminated all financial 
corporations because their capital structure usually differs substantially from other sectors 
in our sample. This could have led to misleading results in our regressions. Companies 
that had been acquired, merged or delisted during the period of our analysis were also 
excluded from our sample, since including them could have given a double listing of 
firms. After, we eliminated all firms that had not been rated throughout the entire time 
period of our study (2009-2013), based on the information accessible from Thomson 
Reuters Eikon. This was done since we wanted to include all years in our analysis. Later 
we excluded companies exchanged on US stock markets, but with headquarters in a 
foreign country. Our aim is to study US firms, which makes our sample more 
homogeneous since these companies follow the same federal regulations. Finally, we 
eliminated all firms that did not experience a change in their Broad rating during the years 
we have examined. This resulted in a final sample of 77 US firms.  
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3.3.1 Descriptive statistics of final sample 
All the companies in our final sample are presented in Appendix 1. Table 2 below 
illustrates the distribution of the sample firms’ credit ratings in the period 2009-2013. The 
majority of the firms, 291 firm-years (76%), are categorized by an investment grade 
rating, and none of the firms in our sample have a lower credit rating than B- (with one 
exception in 2009). This is probably due to the fact that all the firms are large corporations 
from the S&P 500 list, which mostly includes stable, profitable companies. An interesting 
observation is that the firms’ credit ratings have a tendency to move closer towards the 
middle of the credit rating scale during the five-year period, indicating that the firms’ 
credit ratings become more alike. 
 
Table 2: Firms’ rating changes 
              
Firm's Credit Ratings  
Credit 
Rating 
Year  
Firm years 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
AAA 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AA+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AA 1 1 1 1 0 4 
AA-  5 5 4 2 2 18 
A+ 3 2 2 4 5 16 
A 9 8 5 3 2 27 
A- 9 9 15 19 23 75 
BBB+ 15 16 16 18 12 77 
BBB 9 10 6 4 9 38 
BBB- 5 2 5 9 15 36 
BB+ 10 12 14 11 3 50 
BB 3 4 4 4 4 19 
BB- 4 3 2 1 1 11 
B+ 2 2 3 1 1 9 
B 1 2 0 0 0 3 
B- 0 1 0 0 0 1 
C/CCC 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Firm years 77 77 77 77 77 385 
 
 
In table 3 below, the sample firms are divided into each sector according to S&P 500’s 
industry classification. The most represented sector is Consumer Discretionary, with 27% 
share of the sample, followed by Information Technology with 17% share. Although firms 
in the Utilities and Energy sectors have a slightly different capital structure than the rest of 
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the firms in our sample, we include these sectors, as the hypotheses tests will still be 
strong (Kisgen, 2009; Michelsen & Klein, 2011). Hence, in order not to further restrict the 
size of our sample, we include these in our regressions. 
 
Table 3: Industry classification of all firms in the sample 
      
Sector Classification Nr. of Firms Share of Sample 
Consumer Discretionary 21 27% 
Consumer Staples 6 8% 
Energy 4 5% 
Health Care 10 13% 
Industrials 10 13% 
Information Technology 13 17% 
Materials 4 5% 
Telecommunications 2 3% 
Utilities 7 9% 
Total  77 100% 
 
 
3.4 Definitions of variables 
This section seeks to define the variables that are used in the regressions of this study. The 
variables presented below commonly recur and will therefore be explained first. The 
values we have used are based on book values, since these are the values S&P uses in the 
rating processes (2008). Book values also more directly reflect managerial decisions 
(Kisgen, 2006). The financial information is collected from S&P Capital IQ.  
 
• TAit = the book value of total assets for firm i at time t  
• Dit = book long-term debt and book short-term debt for firm i at time t  
• ΔDit = long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction for firm i, 
corrected for changes in current debt in period t to t+1.  
• Eit = book value of total equity for firm i at year t  
• ΔEit = changes in firm i’s total equity during t to t+1, i.e. sale of common and/or 
preferred stock minus purchases of common and/or preferred stock for the same 
period   
• EBITDAit = Firm i’s Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and 
Amortization for year t  
• MtBit = market-to-book value for firm i at time t 
• ROAit = return on asset for firm i at time t  
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3.4.1 Dependent variables 
Three separate regressions with different dependent variables will be conducted. 
 
(1) NetDIss 
As a measure of the firm’s capital structure decisions given its level of credit rating, we 
used a variable defined as the amount of net debt and net equity acquired throughout the 
year, divided by the firm’s total assets at the beginning of the year. 
 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐷𝐼𝑠𝑠!" = (△ 𝐷!" −△ 𝐸!")𝑇𝐴!"  
 
More specifically, net debt issuance is identified through measuring the yearly change in 
the firm’s total debt. Similarly, the change in total equity is calculated through measuring 
the total change in equity throughout the period, including aspects of minority interests for 
the firms where this is applicable. The dependent variable therefore shows the firm’s 
directly subsequent capital structure behavior after the measured credit rating situation. 
This means that we have managed to measure the managers’ direct activities linked to 
capital structure decisions, similar to the measurements in the studies of Kisgen (2006; 
2009). Further, it is also in line with the CR-CS and TTCR hypotheses, which predicts the 
capital structure decisions based on the previous credit rating.  
 
Some potential consequences regarding the dependent variable, which might complicate 
the tests, should be proposed (Kisgen, 2006). First, capital structure decisions might be 
influenced by the fact that debt and equity issuance are associated with transaction costs. 
Second, the capital structure decision process has a time lag, meaning there might be a 
difference in time between making the decision and the execution of it. Third, credit 
ratings might change any time of the year, not only in the end. In this case, the credit 
rating from the beginning of the year may be inaccurate.   
 
(2) △MtB 
In the next regression we want to measure if a rating change might affect an aspect of the 
firm that can be more difficult for managers to influence. In this case we wanted to see 
how a change in Broad rating affects the market value of a firm. The market-to-book ratio 
has a direct connection to the valuation of the firm and its share price, and it is therefore 
suitable to examine the relationship between the market-to-book ratio and credit rating 
changes. As dependent variable we used a measure of the change in the market-to-book 
ratio (△MtB) during the subsequent period after measured credit rating situation. 
 △𝑀𝑡𝐵!" = (𝑀𝑡𝐵!" −𝑀𝑡𝐵!"!!)𝑀𝑡𝐵!"!!  
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The Market-to-Book ratio relates the market value of a firm to its book value (Ogden et al, 
2003). When the market value is high, relative to the book value, the market believes in 
the future of the company. This should be coherent with a higher credit rating. The 
dependent variable more specifically measures the relative increase or decrease in the ratio 
during the period after the firm’s given credit rating situation. 
 
(3) △ROA 
In our last regression we aim to investigate if there is a significant relationship between a 
Broad rating change and the firm’s performance. As a measure of this we used the return 
on asset ratio and calculated the change (△ROA) during the subsequent time period after 
the measured credit rating situation. 
 △ 𝑅𝑂𝐴!" = (𝑅𝑂𝐴!" − 𝑅𝑂𝐴!"!!)𝑅𝑂𝐴!"!!  
 
Return on assets indicates how profitable the firm is in relation to its assets and is further a 
good indicator of how efficient management is at using the firm’s assets to generate 
earnings (Ogden et al., 2003).  
 
The consequences proposed regarding the dependent variable measuring the firm’s capital 
structure decisions might also affect and complicate the latter regressions. Regarding the 
change in the firm’s market value, the time lag might be smaller following a rating 
change. The market reacts on new information, i.e. a firm’s new rating, which will be 
reflected in the share price. In situations where the rating changes during the year, the 
previous rating will be inaccurate. For the performance of a firm, measured through 
changes in △ROA, there might also be a time lag. A rating change in the middle of the 
year implies the same as for the ones previously discussed. Finally, transaction costs might 
also have an impact on the firm’s performance in real life. 
 
3.4.2 Descriptive variables 
The descriptive variables help explain the behavior of the dependent variable. In economic 
research the dependent variable is most commonly explained by several independent 
variables. This explains the relevance of the multiple regressions, taking into account the 
influence of more than one factor (Gujarati & Porter, 2010). However, even if we use a 
multiple regression it is not possible to measure all possible factors that in reality affect 
the dependent variable and the regression still explains a simplified situation. 
 
Our aim is to test whether a change in credit rating affects the capital structure and other 
aspects such as the firm value and overall performance. The credit rating is not the only 
variable that describes the behavior of these figures and it is therefore necessary to use a 
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multiple linear regression and add more explanatory variables. The descriptive variables in 
our study are a set of dummy variables as well as a set of control variables. These will be 
presented below. 
3.4.2.1 Dummy variables 
A dummy variable is used when the data does not fit in ratio or interval measurements. 
The dummy has a value of either 0 or 1, depending on whether a trait is present or 
nonexistent (Weiers, 2011).  Our analysis includes three dummy variables, which indicate 
if a credit rating has changed or not during the immediately preceding period. The first, 
CRchange, indicates a change of any type. CRup, on the other hand, shows whether a 
company has experienced an upgrade. Finally, CRdown indicates if the companies have 
faced downgrades. All three dummies take on the value 0 for the years where no rating 
change has been conducted, while 1 is given if there has been an upgrade or downgrade, 
respectively. The change can be either a Broad rating change from speculative grade to 
investment grade or the reverse, as well as Broad rating changes within the speculative 
and investment grade areas. As mentioned earlier, however, only firms that undergo a 
Broad rating change during the time period are included in our sample. Recall, that we use 
S&P’s long-term domestic issuer credit rating as base for this study and the dummy 
variables describe the credit rating level for each firm in the beginning of each period. The 
dependent variable represents the following 12-month period in order for it to be possible 
to measure effects. 
3.4.2.2 Control Variables 
As mentioned above, the dependent variable is in reality not only affected by the 
independent variables identified in this study. Therefore, a number of control variables 
will be included. Kisgen (2006) as well as Michelsen and Klein (2011) used control 
variables measuring firm size, firm profitability and book leverage. These are firm-
specific factors that help to identify the effect of credit rating changes on capital structure 
decisions, firm value and performance, respectively. Using the same control variables that 
have been used in previous research in our regressions will give us the possibility to 
compare our results to them. 
 
(1) SIZE: 
Several studies have shown that firm size is an important factor to a firm’s credit rating 
(Horrigan, 1966; Ogden et al, 2003). A large company indicates a strong market position 
as well as economies of scale and the risk of default decreases (Ogden et al., 2003). This 
means, that larger firms are less likely to default and therefore it is natural for us to 
include size as a control variable in our regressions. To measure SIZE, we have used total 
assets and logarithmized the values in order to make them look normally distributed. 
Otherwise they would not be comparable to the other variables (Brooks, 2008; Gujarati & 
Porter, 2010). Because of the reduced risk of default, we expect the coefficient of SIZE to 
be positive in NetDIss regressions. Hence, larger firms, with lower probability of distress, 
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issue more debt in relation to equity (Kisgen, 2006). In the other regressions, △MtB and △ROA, we find it likely that the coefficient will be positive as well, because of the 
previously mentioned advantages firm size emphasizes; economies of scale and the strong 
market positions (Ogden et al, 2003). 
 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸!"!! = 𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝐴!"!!  
 
(2) PROF: 
The profitability of a firm is measured as the earnings before interest, taxes and 
depreciation/amortization (EBITDA) and put in relation to the firm’s total assets. The 
value of this measure depends to a large extent on firm characteristics. Firms in our 
sample are from the S&P 500 list, meaning they are considered big, profitable and 
relatively stable. However, there might be significant differences between distinctive 
markets as well as in between different industries. With Kisgen’s (2006) work in mind, we 
expect a positive coefficient for PROF for the NetDIss regressions. He suggests more 
profitable firms to be more hesitant to raise equity. Since we, similar to Kisgen (2006), 
also have US firms in our sample, it is likely that PROF will show the same behavior. 
Regarding our other regressions, we expect PROF to show a positive relationship with 
changes in △MtB and △ROA. This is because an increase in profitability works as positive 
information, which in turn leads to a positive reaction in the market (Fama, 1970). We are 
well aware that △ROA and PROF might measure similar aspects, however the relation 
between the two variables will be tested in a correlation matrix to determine if PROF can 
be used as control variable on △ROA. 
 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹!"!! = 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴!"!!𝑇𝐴!"!!  
 
(2) BL: 
Book Leverage is measured as total debt over total assets and describes the leverage 
situation in firms at the time for the measured credit rating. We expect the coefficients for 
NetDIss to be negative for BL because firms that already have high debt levels tend to 
issue less net debt in relation to net equity (Kisgen, 2006). Since BL and NetDIss might 
measure similar aspects, we will test the correlation between the two variables in a 
correlation matrix. Further, we expect BL to have positive coefficients in △MtB and △ROA since a higher book leverage brings advantages such as lower cost of capital and 
tax shields, which increases both market value and return on assets (Ogden et al., 2003).  
 𝐵𝐿!"!! = 𝐷!"!!𝑇𝐴!"!! 
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3.5 Econometric techniques 
To empirically examine the hypotheses in our study, several multiple regressions will be 
conducted. A multiple regression analysis is an examination of the relationship between 
the dependent variable and a set of two or more independent or explanatory variables. The 
regression estimates a linear relationship, including an error term (𝜀!"), allowing for the 
fact that the relationship is inaccurate (Weiers, 2011). The multiple linear regression 
model we use will be as follows: 
 𝑌!" = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑋!!"+. . .+𝛽!𝑋!"# + 𝜀!" 
 
Where: 
 𝑌!"  is the dependent variable  𝛼 is the intercept 𝛽! is the coefficient 𝑋!"#  are the independent variables 𝜀!"  is the error term 
 
The model presented above is a general model explaining the features of a regression of a 
pooled sample. In pooled data, the elements are of both time-series and cross-sectional 
data (Gujarati & Porter, 2010). The data included in our sample is of both time-series and 
cross-sectional character (Brooks, 2008), where the time-series data refers to the time 
perspective of our study, a five-year sample period. The cross-sectional data refers to the 
width of the data (Gujarati & Porter, 2010), here the 77 firms included in our sample. 
Hence, we will use pooled data by combining the time-series and cross-sectional data 
dimensions in our regressions. In our model, i specifies the particular observation, while t 
indicates the period (year). A special type of pooled data, panel data, is where the same 
cross-sectional unit, here a firm, is surveyed over time (Gujarati & Porter, 2010). The 
pooled data regressions used in our study will be estimated with panel analysis, in order to 
avoid some disadvantages related to pooled data. 
 
The panel data is based on the whole sample period of five years, and the analysis 
combines time-series and cross-sectional observations. This provides results regressed on 
between 382 and 385 observations, which is a result of missing values.  
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3.5.1 OLS Method 
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method is used to estimate the regression models and 
examine the linear relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. The 
OLS method is the most commonly used method in econometrics (Ramanathan, 2002; 
Verbeek, 2004).  In order for the OLS regression to have minimum variance in the linear 
estimators, the regression must fulfill a few assumptions. By fulfilling these assumptions, 
the OLS estimators are Best Linear Unbiased Estimators (BLUE) (Brooks, 2008). The 
regressions can be considered reliable only if these assumptions are met. The OLS 
(CLRM) assumptions are further explained below. 
 
The econometrics software program EViews 7 has been used for all regression analyses in 
this study. 
3.5.1.1 CLRM assumptions 
In order to prove that the OLS estimators fulfill their desirable properties (BLUE) and that 
the hypotheses tests concerning the coefficient estimates are validly conducted, the 
assumptions of the Classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM) need to be fulfilled 
(Brooks, 2008). The five CLRM assumptions, according to Brooks (2008), are as follows: 
 
(1) The average value of the errors is zero. This means that if a constant term is included in 
the regression, this assumption will never be violated. If a regression does not include an 
intercept, and the average value of the errors is not zero, various unwanted consequences 
can occur (Brooks, 2008). We have included a constant term in all of our regressions and 
thereby the assumption is fulfilled. 
 𝜀(𝑢!) = 0 
 
(2) The assumption of homoscedasticity argues that the variance of the errors is constant. If 
the errors do not have a constant variance, they are assumed to be heteroscedastic. Further, 
if the errors are heteroscedastic the variance of the error is the same regardless of the 
independent variables’ value (Brooks, 2008). There are several ways to test for 
homoscedasticity, which is further explained later in the chapter.  
 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑢! = 𝜎! < ∞ 
 
(3) The covariance between the error terms is zero over time or cross-sectionally. That is, it is 
assumed that the errors are uncorrelated with each other. If they had not been correlated 
with one another, the errors would be said to be autocorrelated (Brooks, 2008). It is 
therefore required to do a test of this assumption. To test this we have used the Durbin-
Watson test, which is described in section 3.5.3. 
 𝐶𝑜𝑣 𝑢! ,𝑢! = 0  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑖   ≠ 𝑗 
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(4) The xt are non-stochastic. This means that, provided that the regressors are not correlated 
with the error term, the OLS estimator is consistent and unbiased in the presence of 
stochastic regressors. If one or more of the explanatory variables are simultaneously 
correlated with the error term, the OLS estimator will not be consistent. If X2 and X3 are 
nonstochastic, this assumption is automatically fulfilled. Since E(ut)=0, the expression will 
be zero and the estimator is therefore unbiased (Brooks, 2008). 
 
 𝐶𝑜𝑣 𝑢! , 𝑥! = 0 
 
(5) The disturbances are normally distributed. The normality assumption;   
 
  𝑢! ≈ 𝑁(0,𝜎!) 
 
is required in order to conduct single or combined hypothesis tests about the model 
parameters (Brooks, 2008). 
 
We have included another assumption that Gujarati & Porter (2010) mention as an equally 
important OLS assumption, multicollinearity. This occurs when two or more of the 
independent variables are highly correlated with each other. Multicollinearity may cause a 
problem because it can present abnormal results when testing how well the independent 
variables describe the dependent variable (Brooks, 2008). The problem appears when the 
independent variables do not describe enough of the dependent variable (Weiers, 2001). 
 
3.5.1.2 Tests to support the CLRM assumptions 
To examine whether our regressions are reliable, it is essential to perform tests to control 
that they fulfill the requirements. The different tests and results are presented below, and 
further examined in chapter 4. The test results are shown in Appendix 2.  
 
Heteroscedasticity 
A problem that can arise in multiple linear regression is heteroscedasticity. This implies 
that the assumption that the random term should have a constant variable is not fulfilled 
(Brooks, 2008). In other words, a test of heteroscedasticity shows how well a regression 
model can predict whether a dependent variable is consistent across all values of the 
dependent variable. If a high level of heteroscedasticity exists, the OLS-estimation will 
not show the lowest variance and thereby better estimations will exist (Brooks 2008). 
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Autocorrelation 
The consequences of ignoring autocorrelation when it is present are similar to those of 
ignoring heteroscedasticity. Therefore, in addition to the test of heteroscedasticity, a test of 
autocorrelation has been conducted. To test for this we have used the results from the 
Durbin-Watson test in the EViews regressions. The Durbin-Watson statistic can take on 
values between 0 and 4. If it assumes a value under 2, it has a negative autocorrelation, 
while over 2 indicates a positive autocorrelation. Thereby, you want to be as near 2 as 
possible, which indicates no autocorrelation (Gujarati & Porter, 2010). 
 
Normality test 
According to Körner et al (2000) and Weiers (2011), the residuals from the regression 
need to be normally distributed so that a confidence interval can be created. To test if our 
regressions hold, we will perform a Jarque-Bera normality test, which according to Brooks 
(2008) is one of the most commonly applied tests for normality. The Jarque-Bera test uses 
the property of a normally distributed random variable that the entire distribution is 
characterized by the mean and variance. Furthermore, the standardized moments of a 
distribution also include its skewness and kurtosis. Skewness measures the symmetric 
distribution around the mean, and the kurtosis measures how fat the tails of the 
distribution are. If the residuals are normally distributed, the histogram in the Jarque-Bera 
test should be bell-shaped and the Jarque-Bera statistic should not be significant (Brooks, 
2008). 
 
Multicollinearity 
To control for multicollinearity between the independent variables we apply them to a 
correlation matrix, which is shown in Appendix 2. Here we will accept correlations of up 
to -0.5/0.5. Another way to check for multicollinearity is to examine the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) of the variables, however we find it excessive to conduct both in our study 
(Weiers, 2011).  
 
3.6 Regressions and hypotheses 
In section 3.4 we presented an overview and definitions over terms and variables that are 
used in this study’s regressions. The regressions, in full, will also be presented in this 
section.  
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The following regressions will be tested: 
 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐷𝐼𝑠𝑠!" = 𝑐 + 𝛽!𝐶𝑅!!!"#$ +   𝜙𝐾!" + 𝜀!"    (Model 3.1) 
 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐷𝐼𝑠𝑠!" = 𝑐 + 𝛽!𝐶𝑅!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑅!"#$ +   𝜙𝐾!" + 𝜀!"  (Model 3.2) 
 
 △𝑀𝑡𝐵!" = 𝑐 + 𝛿!𝐶𝑅!!!"#$ +   𝜙𝐾!" + 𝜀!"    (Model 3.3) 
 △𝑀𝑡𝐵!" = 𝑐 + 𝛿!𝐶𝑅!" + 𝛿!𝐶𝑅!"#$ +   𝜙𝐾!" + 𝜀!"   (Model 3.4)  
 
 △ 𝑅𝑂𝐴!" = 𝑐 + 𝛾!𝐶𝑅!!!"#$ +   𝜙𝐾!" + 𝜀!"    (Model 3.5) 
 △ 𝑅𝑂𝐴!" = 𝑐 + 𝛾!𝐶𝑅!" + 𝛾!𝐶𝑅!"#$ +   𝜙𝐾!" + 𝜀!"   (Model 3.6)  
 
 
Where:    
 
• NetDIssit = net debt in relation to net equity raised by the firm, scaled to the firm’s 
total assets  
• △MtBit = the period change in market-to-book ratio for firm i at time t, consisting 
of the market value calculated through the number of shares and the outstanding 
share price relative to book value  
• △ROAit = the period change in return on asset ratio for firm i at time t 
• CRchange = dummy variable for firms that have undergone a Broad rating change; 
then CRchange = 1; otherwise 0  
• CRup = dummy variable for firms that have undergone a Broad rating upgrade in 
the beginning of the period tested; then CRup = 1; otherwise 0  
• CRdown = dummy variable for firms with a Broad rating downgrade in the 
beginning of the period; then CRdown = 1; otherwise 0  
• Kit = a set of control variables, presented above, including SIZEit-1, PROFit-1 and 
BLit-1  
 
3.6.2 Specification of hypotheses 
In the following study, we will test the existing relationship between credit ratings and 
important aspects for the firm such as managers’ subsequent capital structure decisions, 
markets firm valuation and firms overall profitability. We will test the hypothesis at a 10% 
significance level.  
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The first hypothesis (HNetDIss) affects firms’ capital structure behavior relative the credit 
rating: 
 
HNetDIss: Firms that have undergone a Broad rating change issue more debt in relation to 
equity compared to firms that did not undergo a Broad rating change. 
 
H0: 𝛽!   ≤ 0   i = 1, 2, 3 
 
H1: 𝛽! > 0       
 
The next hypothesis (𝐻∆!"#) concerns market valuation, and are stated: 
 𝐻∆!"#: Firms that have undergone a Broad rating change will also experience a change 
in market valuation. 
 
H0: 𝛿! = 0    i = 1, 2, 3  
 
H1: 𝛿! ≠ 0   
 
The last, (𝐻∆!"#) concerns firms’ performance: 
             𝐻∆!"#: A Broad rating change will affect firms’ performance. 
 
H0: 𝛾! = 0   i = 1, 2, 3   
 
H1: 𝛾! ≠ 0  
 
3.6.3 Interpretation of regression results 
The multiple coefficient of determination (R2) indicates the proportion of variation in the 
dependent variable that is described by the explanatory variables (Brooks, 2008). Since 
there are many elements that influence the choice of firms’ capital structure, credit ratings 
cannot alone explain capital structure decisions. The same applies to the market-to-book 
ratio in relation to valuation as well as the return on assets ratio in relation to performance. 
Based on this fact, we expect a low R2 our regressions. This is also consistent with 
previous studies on CR-CS (Kisgen, 2006; Michelsen & Klein 2011). Even though we 
believe that our regression will show a low R2, previous studies on the CR-CS hypothesis 
emphasize results showing statistical and economical significance. We therefore believe 
this will be true for the other regressions as well. Furthermore the R2 will reflect cross-
sectional values of panel data. Thereby we will be able to compare the different companies 
based on all the respective years.  
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Regression coefficients explain the effect independent variables have on the dependent 
variable (Brooks, 2008). Our method is based on the CR-CS hypothesis that expects a 
negative coefficient for the dummy variables, signifying that the dummies will have a 
negative effect on the dependent variables. In other words, firms close to a credit change 
will issue less net debt. However, we want to test whether firms change their capital 
structure after a change in credit rating and therefore expect a positive coefficient for both 
our dummy variables in the NetDIss regressions.  
 
The effective market hypothesis states that share prices always reflect all relevant 
information. Since credit ratings reflect firm information the rating will also have an effect 
on the market value. An increased rating indicates that the rating firm has confidence in 
the rated firm’s future prospect. Hence, we presume that a positive coefficient for our 
dummies following an upgrade, while a downgrade will result in a negative coefficient in 
the △MtB regression. The same applies for the △ROA regression since enhanced market 
confidence in a company can lift future outlook. 
 
The regressions will be tested on a 10% significance level, meaning that the null 
hypothesis can only be rejected if the p-value for the coefficients falls below 0.10. Each 
variable is studied, using the p-value, in terms of its statistical significance. The p-value 
indicates the least significance level that the null hypothesis can be rejected for each 
coefficient. 
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4. RESULTS 
 
             
 
In the following chapter we will present the results from our regressions. Further, the 
hypotheses tests and the model of fit will be examined. 
             
 
4.1 Descriptive results 
A summary of the sample statistics is presented in table 4 below. Our final sample consists 
of 77 companies, which equals 385 firm-years. The table presents the relationship between 
the firms’ credit ratings and debt levels. The means, medians and standard deviations of 
every Broad rating category are displayed below. If we compare firms with credit rating 
AA to firms with an A rating, we see that firms with the lower credit rating issue more 
debt. The same result is evident between firms with credit rating BB compared to B or 
lower. However, it is not possible to see this relationship throughout the whole sample.  
 
 
Table 4: Summary of the sample’s rating level and firm leverage 
 
    AA A BBB BB B or lower 
Numer of firm-years 22 118 151 80 14 
Debt/(Debt+Equity) 
     Mean 
 
61,8% 65,5% 61,7% 51,6% 62,0% 
Median 
 
61,4% 64,7% 62,1% 53,7% 61,4% 
Std. Dev.   12,5% 23,0% 15,8% 15,6% 23,3% 
Note: firms with credit ratings followed by (+) or (–) are included in each one of the five Broad rating 
categories. For example, A+ and A– are both calculated for in category A.  
 
4.1.2 NetDiss 
Figure 5 shows the relationship between the credit rating and the dependent variable 
NetDiss expressed as mean value for each category. The figure shows an evident 
relationship: companies with lower creditworthiness, and therefore have a lower rating, 
issue less debt relative to equity than firms with higher credit ratings.  
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Figure 5: Average net debt minus net equity per credit rating category for sample, 2009-
2013 
 
 
Note: firms with credit ratings followed by (+) or (–) are included in each one of the five Broad rating 
categories. For example, A+ and A– are both calculated for in category A.  
 
4.2 Regression results 
 
4.2.1 Diagnostic testing of the CLRM assumptions 
All six regressions are tested for the CLRM assumptions presented in 3.5.2. The first 
assumption, stating that the average value of the errors is zero, is fulfilled because a 
constant term is included in all regressions.  
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By using White standard errors and covariance for the panel data analysis, the 
heteroscedasticity problems were corrected. Thereby, the second assumption is fulfilled. 
The third assumption, concerning autocorrelation, was tested using Durbin-Watson. The 
results from this test showed statistics ranging between 1.22 and 1.95. This implies signs 
of slightly negative autocorrelation, however it is considered an acceptable level (Brooks, 
2008). Assumption five, concerning normal distribution, was tested with Jarque-Bera 
tests. The results of the Jarque-Bera tests are provided in Appendix 2 and show that our 
sample is normally distributed.  
 
Finally, the correlation matrix presented in Appendix 2 shows the correlations between 
two variables. The correlations between variables that will not be displayed in the same 
regressions are not outlined in the matrix. A few correlations slightly exceed our level of 
acceptance. However, since they lie close to -0.5/0.5 we find our level of multicollinearity 
acceptable. 
 
4.2.2 Broad rating tests 
Table 5 on the following page shows a compilation of the regression results. They are 
arranged and categorized after each respective regression. The first numbers presented are 
the variable coefficients, followed by White standard errors in parentheses. The level of 
significance is shown in bold and in parentheses below. 
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Table 5: Regression results 
Note: The results showed in the table are for the pooled sample 2009-2013. The first presented numbers 
are the coefficients, while numbers in parentheses are the standard errors (corrected for heteroscedasticity 
using White diagonal standard errors). Numbers in bold and in parentheses shows the probability of 
significance. Last, the models adjusted R2 and F-statistics are presented. Firm-years vary since those with 
missing values of any variable are excluded.   
 
The results in table 5 above are used to test the three hypotheses. The first one, HNetDIss, 
H0: 𝛽!   ≤ 0  and H1: 𝛽! > 0 for i = 1, 2, 3, is a one-sided hypothesis which can be tested 
with model 3.1 and 3.2. The null hypothesis (H0) suggests that firms that have undergone 
a Broad rating change are indifferent or issue less debt in relation to equity. The credit 
rating dummy variables coefficients show positive signs for CRdown and CRchange as 
predicted, however for CRup the coefficient is negative. Since the 𝛽! for i = 1, 3 show the 
predicted signs, we can reject H0 as long as the one-sided p-values of the credit rating 
                  
 
NetDIss   
 
△MtB   
 
△ROA   
 Model 3.1 Model 3.2    Model 3.3  Model 3.4    Model 3.4  Model 3.6  
Intercept: -0.6439 -0.6438 
 
-1.2725 -1.2222 
 
-0.1443 -0.1852 
 
(0.2125) (0.2108) 
 
(1.4492) (1.4255) 
 
(0.9754) (0.9600) 
 
(0.0026) (0.0024) 
 
(0.3805) (0.3917) 
 
(0.8825) (0.8472) 
CRchange: 0.0436 - 
 
0.0603 - 
 
-0.1117 - 
 
(0.0291) - 
 
(0.1652) - 
 
(0.1814) - 
 
(0.1355) - 
 
(0.7155) - 
 
(0.5385) - 
CRup: - -0.0011 
 
- -0.1219 
 
- 0.0735 
 
- (0.0447) 
 
- (0.0746) 
 
- (0.1009) 
 
- (0.9806) 
 
- (0.0979) 
 
- (0.4672) 
CRdown: - 0.06773 
 
- -0.1099 
 
- 0.0427 
 
- (0.0405) 
 
- (0.1097) 
 
- (0.2347) 
 
- (0.0954) 
 
- (0.3171) 
 
- (0.8556) 
SIZE: 0.0550 0.05577 
 
0.1613 0.1616 
 
-0.0147 -0.0158 
 
(0.0189) (0.0191) 
 
(0.1329) (0.1330) 
 
(0.0762) (0.0779) 
 
(0.0040) (0.0037) 
 
(0.2257) (0.2251) 
 
(0.8475) (0.8391) 
PROF: 2.4646 2.4626 
 
-0.6097 -0.6476 
 
0.6492 0.6865 
 
(0.7748) (0.7710) 
 
(0.5501) (0.5427) 
 
(0.7307) (0.7266) 
 
(0.0016) (0.0015) 
 
(0.2684) (0.2335) 
 
(0.3749) (0.3454) 
BL: -0.3750 -0.3809 
 
0.1374 0.1256 
 
0.2167 0.2291 
 
(0.1403) (0.1430) 
 
(0.3816) (0.3807) 
 
(0.31105) (0.3113) 
 (0.0078) (0.0081)   (0.7190) (0.7416)   (0.4865) (0.4623)  
Adj R2: 0.6148 0.6192 
 
0.0234 0.0222 
 
0.0067 0.0101 
F-statistics: 153.8125 122.9305 
 
3.2851 2.7310 
 
0.3650 0.2371 
Firm-years: 384 384   382 382   382  382 
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dummy variables are significant. This implies that they must be below the chosen 10 % 
significance level. Note however, that the p-values in bold and in parentheses above, are 
the p-values for a two-sided test and therefore not applicable for HNetDIss, which is a one-
sided hypothesis. The p-values applicable for all the hypotheses are shown in table 6.  
 
H0 is rejected at the 10% level for model 3.1, but for model 3.2 it cannot be rejected at the 
10% level since CRup shows insignificance with a one-sided p-value of 0.4903. However, 
CRdown shows a p-value of 0,0477, which means it is significant at a 5% level. HNetDIss 
cannot be rejected by model 3.2 since both CRup and CRdown must show significance to 
reject H0.  Also, CRup has a negative coefficient, which is not in line with HNetDIss. 
However, if only CRdown is taken into account, H0 can be rejected at a 5% significance 
level. This states that firms that have undergone a Broad rating downgrade issue more debt 
relative to equity.  
 
The results from model 3.1, which are significant at the 10% level, suggest that firms that 
undergo any type of Broad rating change issue 4.36% more net debt relative net equity 
compared to firms that do not experience a Broad rating change. Further, the results from 
model 3.2 suggest that firms that undergo a Broad rating upgrade subsequently issue 
0.11% less net debt in relation to net equity in the following financial year compared to 
firms that do not undergo a Broad rating upgrade. However, this is not significant and can 
therefore not be confirmed. A Broad rating downgrade instead implies that firms issue 
6.77% more debt relative equity the subsequent year after the change, which is significant 
at the 5% level shown above. Still, H0 cannot be rejected. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Results of hypotheses tests 
                  
 
NetDIss    
 
△MtB   
 
△ROA    
  Model 3.1 Model 3.2   Model 3.3 Model 3.4    Model 3.5 Model 3.6 
H0:  Rejected 
(Not) 
Rejected 
 
Not 
Rejected Rejected 
 
Not 
Rejected 
Not  
Rejected  
CRchange  0,0678 - 
 
0,7155 - 
 
0,5385 - 
CRup  - 0,4903 
 
- 0,0979 
 
- 0,4672 
CRdown  - 0,0477   - 0,3171   - 0,8556 
Note: The numbers in the table shows the p-values of the credit dummy variables. For NetDIss regressions 
(model 3.1 and 3.2) one-sided p-values are presented. For the rest, the table shows two-sided p-values. If 
respective values fall below the significance level of 10 %, each model’s null hypothesis is rejected. For 
model 3.2 the hypothesis can be rejected according to CRdown, however not for CRup.  
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The second hypothesis, 𝐻∆!"#, H0:  𝛿! = 0 versus H1: 𝛿! ≠ 0  for i = 1, 2, 3 is tested with 
model 3.3 and 3.4. Here, the null hypothesis (H0) suggests that the market is indifferent 
with Broad rating changes in their firm valuation. The credit rating dummy variable 
coefficient shows negative signs for CRchange, presented in model 3.3 in table 5, which is in 
line with our predictions. Contradictory, model 3.4’s CRup and CRdown presented in the 
same table have negative coefficients, which was not expected. This means, 𝛿!   for i = 1 
does behave according to the expectations, but for 𝛿!   i = 2, 3 does not. However, the 
hypothesis is double-sided which allows both positive and negative coefficients regardless 
of our expectations. The two-sided p-values for model 3.3 and 3.4 in table 6 need to be 
taken into account. 
 
In model 3.3 CRchange has the predicted positive sign of the coefficient but is not significant 
with a p-value of 0.7155, meaning that H0 cannot be rejected. On the other hand, in model 
3.4 the credit dummy variable CRup shows significance on the 10 % level with a two-sided 
p-value of 0.0979. The coefficient is negative, which implies that H0 can be rejected. The 
model therefore suggests that firms that undergo a Broad rating upgrade will be devalued 
by the market with 12.19% in the subsequent financial year. CRdown on the other hand, also 
in model 3.4, does not show any significance with a p-value of 0.3171 and therefore does 
not support the rejection of H0. Hence, H0 for the hypothesis 𝐻∆!"#   can be rejected by 
model 3.4 according to CRup’s significance. In other words, model 3.4 suggests that firms 
do experience a valuation change (devaluation) when they achieve a higher Broad rating, 
but not when downgraded.  
 
Since the p-value for CRdown is insignificant, the suggested results cannot be confirmed. 
Had it been significant, it would have implied that firms that were downgraded would be 
devalued with 10.99%. Model 3.3 suggests that firms that undergo a Broad rating change 
of any type will increase in market value with 6.0% the subsequent year. Recall, this result 
did not show any significance either. 
 
The third hypothesis 𝐻∆!"#, H0:  𝛾! = 0 versus H1: 𝛾! ≠ 0  for i = 1, 2, 3 is tested with 
model 3.5 and 3.6. The null hypothesis suggests that firms’ performance is not affected by 
a Broad rating change. The dummy variables’ coefficients show negative signs for 
CRchange, which is not expected, but has as predicted positive signs for both CRup and 
CRdown in model 3.6. Since this a double-sided hypothesis, we can reject H0 based on only 
significance, and we therefore do not have to consider the direction of the coefficients. 
None of the credit rating dummy variables in the models show significant p-values at any 
acceptable levels (0.4672; 0.8556; 0.5385). Consequently, we cannot confirm that a Broad 
rating change affects firms’ performance. 
 
If the regressions had shown significance, model 3.5 would have implied that a change of 
any kind would lower the profitability with 11.17% over the subsequent 12-month period. 
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Model 3.6, however, implies the reverse relationship, suggesting that firms after a Broad 
rating upgrade would increase their profitability during the subsequent fiscal year with 
7.34%. After a downgrade they would also increase their profitability, but with only 
4.27%. This indicates that model 3.6 suggests any Broad rating change to increase firms’ 
performance. Again, none of the models showed significance and therefore the indicated 
results cannot be confirmed.  
 
4.2.3 Control Variables and Model-Fit  
The SIZE variable takes on positive coefficients as predicted in both model 3.1 and 3.2 
(NetDIss regressions). This is significant on the 1% level with p-values 0.0040 and 0.0037 
respectively, which indicates that size has a strong positive effect on the net debt relative 
net equity issuance for firms. For model 3.3 and 3.4 (△MtB regressions) the variable 
shows positive coefficients as well, but for model 3.5 and 3.6 (△ROA regressions) the 
signs are negative. However, SIZE shows statistical insignificance in the last four models. 
Further, PROF shows positive signs for NetDIss and △ROA regressions, but not for the △MtB’s. Although, only model 3.1 and 3.2 shows significance with p-values 0.0016 and 
0.0015, PROF is statistically insignificant in all other regressions. For the last control 
variable, BL, the coefficient is significant only for the NetDIss regressions with negative 
coefficients, but insignificant for the rest with positive coefficients.  
 
Additionally, the model fit for the estimated regressions, which are measured by the 
adjusted R2, are 0.6148 and 0.6192 for NetDIss’ regressions. For the other four regressions 
the model fit ranges from 0.0101 to 0.0234. Further, the F-statistics show high 
significance in the NetDIss regressions (below the 0.1% level). For △MtB, the F-statistics 
are significant at the 5% level but for △ROA they are not. Therefore, the F-statistics 
indicate that there is a strong relationship between the dependent variable and all or some 
of the explanatory variables for the NetDIss and △MtB regressions, but not for △ROA.  
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5. ANALYSIS 
 
             
 
In this chapter we will analyze the results based on the theoretical framework presented 
earlier in our study. Our aim is to first analyze the effects of credit ratings on capital 
structure decisions, followed by their effect on other important firm aspects. Finally, we 
will outline relevant limitations that might have affected our results. 
             
 
 
5.1 Descriptive results 
The results presented in table 4 show no major differences between companies’ credit 
rating level and the level of debt they carry in their capital structure. One explanation 
could be that our statistical sample might be too small to show any differences in debt 
levels between the categories. The first category (AA) includes a total of 22 firm-years, 
which reflects the debt levels of only 7 companies, which could not be considered 
representable for the whole category. Another explanation of our result might be the fact 
that our study is based on large cap firms. These firms are well established and therefore 
able to take on more debt in either one of the credit rating categories.  
 
Figure 5, on the other hand, suggests that firms with higher credit ratings issue more net 
debt relative to equity. The reason for this can be that firms with a high rating use their 
financial strength to issue more debt and thereby change their capital structure. These 
firms get better terms by issuing debt and therefore the cost will be lower than when 
raising equity. Firms with lower credit ratings may find equity issuance as the best 
alternative, though a lower rating will result in higher costs issuing debt and taking on 
debt might damage their creditworthiness even further. In addition these firms may not 
have access to debt markets based on their rating. 
 
5.2 Capital Structure 
Our first research question addresses whether a change in Broad rating affect a firm’s 
capital structure decisions by issuing more debt. We found a significant relationship 
between credit ratings and managers’ subsequent capital structure decisions. This result 
has also been confirmed in previous research (Ogden et al, 2003; Kisgen, 2006; Kisgen, 
2009; Michelsen & Klein, 2011; Kemper & Rao, 2013). To be able to investigate this 
relationship, a null hypothesis for HNetDIss was formulated, stating that firms that have 
undergone a Broad rating change are indifferent or issue less debt in relation to equity. 
The null hypothesis could be rejected, which confirms that companies that undergo a 
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Broad rating change will alter their capital structure. More precisely, our results suggest 
that firms issue 4.36% more net debt relative net equity following a change. Even though 
not statistically significant, the results from our sample further suggest that an upgrade 
leads to less debt issuance. These results are consistent with Ogden et al’s (2003) who 
found that downgrades result in an increase of debt issuance in relation to equity whilst 
upgrades result in decreased debt levels. The lack of significance in our CRup results might 
depend on the characteristics of our sample.     
 
Kisgen (2009) found that, based on the TTCR theory, firms issue 1.5%-2.0% less net debt 
when downgraded, which is the opposite of our results.  However, Kisgen (2009) found 
that this was more significant for firms downgraded to a speculative grade, and more 
relevant for lower ratings. The contradictory results suggested in this study can therefore 
be explained by our sample consisting of mostly investment graded firms. Our sample 
firms might not be consistent with Kisgen’s (2009) because they may act differently than 
lower rated firms. The CR-CS hypothesis (Kisgen, 2006) states that firms, regardless of 
their credit rating, issue less debt when they are close to a change in credit rating. Note 
that the CR-CS hypothesis is suggested to be true for firms close to being upgraded or 
downgraded, while our study focuses on actual Broad rating changes. This implies that 
there may consist discrepancies in our findings compared to Kisgen’s (2006).  Figure 3C 
and D shows how the trade-off theory outweighs CR-CS, which supports our results. 
Kemper and Rao (2013) found that the CR-CS method may only be relevant for 
examining speculatively rated firms and therefore support our results since our sample 
consists of mainly higher rated firms. 
 
We could not verify that firms that have undergone a Broad rating change issue more debt 
in relation to equity for both upgrades and downgrades. However, our results suggest that 
firms issue as much as 6.77% more debt after a Broad rating downgrade. As mentioned, 
Kisgen (2009) found a more convincing relationship for downgrades, which implied that 
downgrades resulted in firms issuing less debt. This means that our result is not consistent 
with Kisgen’s (2009).  Again, this can be explained by our sample being too small and 
containing higher rated and stable firms. Another explanation for the different results 
might be that large cap firms can act different and issue more debt than the firms Kisgen 
researched. Note that the issuance of 6.77% more debt after a Broad rating change cannot 
be generalized and only applies to larger firms in the years that we have examined. 
 
The main theories of capital structure, the trade-off and pecking order theory, can to some 
extent explain the issuance of debt for firms that have experienced a Broad rating change. 
The trade-off theory implies that firms increase their value by issuing more debt based on 
discrete benefits, which is consistent with our results for downgrade. According to the 
pecking order theory, firms want to issue debt rather than equity, because of the costs 
associated with raising equity. Our results for downgrade are consistent with this theory 
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since downgraded firms issue more debt to equity. However, the trade-off and pecking 
order theories cannot explain capital structure decisions after Broad rating upgrades.  
 
5.2.1 Model fit for NetDIss  
NetDIss can be explained by 61% - 62% by the descriptive variables in the model.  In 
other words, this means that a 61% - 62% of a firm’s capital structure decisions can be 
explained by credit rating changes as well as the financial ratios used in the model. 
Though this might seem like a low fit, it is in line with previous research. Ogden et al’s 
study (2003) showed a model fit of 67.5%, which is slightly higher than our result. Since 
there are more factors affecting capital structure decisions than credit ratings and our 
chosen control variables, our model of fit is realistic. Some of these other factors, like 
company traditions, industry characteristics and managements’ preferences, are difficult or 
even impossible to measure. Since these and other factors are not taken into account, our 
model cannot fully explain capital structure decisions. Further, the F-statistics show high 
significance in the NetDIss regression, which shows a strong relationship between the net 
debt in relation to net equity and all or some of the explanatory variables.  
 
5.3 Other firm aspects; Valuation and Profitability 
Our second research question addresses whether a Broad rating change affects other firm 
aspects like valuation and profitability. Valuation was measured with market-to-book 
(△MtB), while profitability was measured with return on assets (△ROA).  
 
If the efficient market hypothesis holds, all relevant information is reflected in the market 
at all times (Fama, 1970). This should mean that a higher credit rating would lead to a 
higher △MtB value, as this provides a positive outlook. This applies to perfect markets, 
which is not fully applicable for a reality-based sample of firms. Our results for △MtB 
showed significance for a rating upgrade, though it suggested that the market-to-book ratio 
would decrease with 12.19%. This is not consistent with the efficient market hypothesis 
since a positive change (i.e. an upgrade) should be valued as positive information on the 
market and thereby increase the market value. Several different factors can explain our 
results. First, our sample period is directly following the previous financial crisis. The 
stock price, which our market value is based on, also reflects aspects that are not firm-
specific, like psychological and macroeconomic factors. This supports that the financial 
crisis might have had an impact on our sample and therefore may have affected the results. 
Second, because our sample consists of large cap firms we may have developed results 
that are inconsistent with usual market behavior concerning all types of market 
capitalizations (i.e. small, mid and large cap firms). When firms reach a certain size, there 
is a risk that they can become inefficient, however still profitable, and a rating change will 
in this case not necessarily imply higher market valuation. Also, there are differences in 
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△MtB ratios between sectors (for sample sectors see table 3), which make it difficult to 
compare all the companies (Ogden et al., 2003).  
 
In addition to valuation, we also considered performance to be affected by credit rating 
changes. Kemper and Rao (2013) mention that performance, along with other firm 
aspects, affects credit ratings. Therefore, we wanted to examine whether the reverse 
relationship also was evident. As presented in our results, we cannot prove a significant 
relationship between credit rating changes and a firm’s performance. Similar to Ogden et 
al (2003) and Kisgen (2006; 2009), our sample includes firms from several different 
industries, which again might disturb the results. The profitability varies in different 
sectors, for example it can be considered to be high in the pharmaceutical sector compared 
to the consumer goods sector. This may imply that credit rating changes have a significant 
effect on the performance in some sectors but not in others. Also, in a sector with a very 
high profitability, the effect of a credit rating change will not have a large effect on their 
performance. 
 
5.3.1 Model fit for △MtB and △ROA  
As expected, the model of fit is low and falls in a range from 1% - 2.5% for the valuation 
and performance models. We expected a low fit since there are many factors that explain 
these firm aspects, however we did expect that credit ratings would show significance in 
both models. The low fit may also be explained by the chosen control variables. They are 
too few in relation to all factors affecting performance and valuation, and it would be 
impossible to include all factors in the model. Also, credit ratings are to some extent based 
on confidential information, which is why it can be difficult to fully explain ratings in 
relation to valuation and performance. Another reason is that they are affected by firm 
specific factors and the raters’ individual opinion (Horrigan, 1966).  For △MtB the F- 
statistics shows significance, indicating a strong relationship between the dependent 
variable and all or some of the explanatory variables. However, significance could not be 
confirmed for △ROA.  
 
5.4 Comparison of firm aspects  
Our results suggest that credit rating changes have a greater effect on some firm aspects 
than others. As expected, the capital structure is more affected than valuation and 
performance. This is because valuation and performance are affected by so many other 
factors than credit ratings, for example management preferences and macroeconomic 
factors. Since the market affects valuation and performance, firms have less control over 
these aspects than they have on capital structure.  
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5.5 Limitations  
The fact that we have limited our sample to only containing companies listed on S&P 500 
entails that the firms are large and most rather successful. Further, this means that the 
majority of the credit ratings are in the investment grade category, which is a recurring 
problem that also Ogden et al (2003) experienced. Since companies can decide whether 
they want to publish their ratings, it may not have helped to examine a larger population. 
 
The sample data was collected from a 5-year period, from 2009 to 2013. Therefore our 
findings may include events specific for this period. Our sample contained more upgrades 
than downgrades. As discussed above, the recent financial crisis in 2007/2008 might have 
an impact on our findings. Firms that were downgraded during the financial crisis may 
have been upgraded the following years when the economy was stabilized, which in turn 
might have affected our results. 
 
There might exist some limitations regarding the dependent variables. First, capital 
structure decisions might be influenced by the fact that debt and equity issuance are 
associated with transaction costs. Second, affecting all the dependent variables, there may 
be a time lag between the credit rating change and the effect it has on the financial ratios. 
Last, credit ratings do not only change in the end of the year, but also during. This means 
that there is a risk that some of the credit ratings used in the model are inaccurate (Kisgen, 
2006).  
 
As previously mentioned, our sample includes several industries. Some financial ratios 
used in this study are sector-specific, which may have caused noise in our findings. 
Consequently, the model fit (𝑅!) might be lower than in research that only examines one 
sector. Furthermore, differences between industries may cause misleading results, for 
example the utilities sector has a different capital structure than other sectors. This can 
result in unwanted insignificance since the sample data is drawn in different directions. 
However, this is not a study examining specific sectors.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
             
 
The final chapter will present the conclusions of our study, in addition to suggestions for 
further research within the field.  
             
 
6.1 Concluding remarks 
This study examined whether a change in Broad rating has an impact on capital structure 
decisions, valuation and firm performance of US firms. We conducted a study that 
extended the scope of previous research, with background from mainly Ogden et al (2003) 
and Kisgen (2006; 2009), in addition to main theories and other relevant literature within 
the field. Our expectations were that credit rating changes had an effect on firms’ capital 
structure decisions, and to some extent an impact on valuation and firm performance.  
 
We found that firms do change their capital structure by issuing more debt after a 
downgrade, however we could not confirm the same for upgrades. Our results indicate that 
credit rating changes do not have a large impact on valuation and performance. These 
results can be explained partly because our data sample includes firms from different 
industries. Had we chosen to analyze only one sector, the results would probably have 
shown a stronger relationship since yield levels are valued differently between industries, 
which in turn is reflected in stock prices and market response. However, the main reason 
is that many other factors affect valuation and performance that credit ratings alone cannot 
explain the behavior of these aspects. 
 
We believe that the financial crisis can be another explanation for our results, since the 
market did not function properly. Thereby investors may have been prevented in following 
credit rating changes when investing due to economical barriers. Many firms were also 
downgraded during the financial crisis and later upgraded when the economy recovered. 
This can be an explanation to why our sample includes more upgrades than downgrades.  
 
The CR-CS and TTCR hypotheses are not suitable for investment graded firms according 
to our results. Furthermore, our results indicate that the trade-off theory outweighs the CR-
CS hypothesis.  
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6.2 Suggestions for further research 
Several new research questions and potential approaches have come to our attention. Our 
suggestions for further research are as follows:   
 
As previously mentioned in our analysis, the final sample of this study might be too small 
to show any significant results. Therefore, it would be interesting in further research to 
choose a larger sample (i.e. all firms rated by S&P) to see if it is possible to achieve more 
significant results. Then, it would also be possible to examine if firms react differently to 
Broad rating changes depending on whether they are investment or speculative graded 
firms.  
 
A way to further examine the topic of credit ratings’ effect on firms’ capital structure 
decisions and other financial ratios would be to apply the same empirical framework on 
mid cap firms. Since these firms are smaller and according to our study have less debt in 
their capital structure, the results would probably be more significant compared to when 
just investigating large cap firms. By doing this it would also be possible to compare the 
findings to our study.  
 
Another suggestion would be to apply the same empirical set-up but using a different 
credit rating agency (i.e. Moody’s or Fitch) to investigate if there are any differences 
between the impacts of rating considerations between the agencies. 
 
As an extension of this study, it would also be interesting to investigate large cap firms in 
other markets, such as the Asian, with the same empirical set-up to see if the results 
support our findings. This would make it possible to compare emerging markets with 
established markets.  
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Appendix 1 – Table of sample firms  
 
A 
Abbot Laboratories  
AGL Resources Inc. 
Amazon.com Inc.  
AmerisourceBergen Corp 
Analog Devices Inc. 
AutoNation Inc.  
Avon Products 
 
B 
Becton Dickinson 
Bemis Company  
Best But Co. Inc.  
BIOGEN IDEC Inc. 
 
C 
Campbell Soup 
Cardinal Health Inc.  
CenterPoint Energy  
CenturyLink Inc. 
CIGNA Corp.  
Cintas Corporation 
Comcast Corp. 
Computer Sciences Corp. 
Cummins Inc.  
 
D 
Dentsply International 
Duke Energy  
Dun & Bradstreet  
 
E 
Ecolab Inc.  
 
F 
Fidelity National 
Information Services 
Flowserve Corporation  
FMC Corporation  
Ford Motor  
 
 
 
G 
Gap  
Graham Holdings 
Company  
 
H 
Harley-Davidson  
Harman Int’l Industries  
Hewlett-Packard  
Home Depot  
 
I 
Integrys Energy Group 
Inc.  
International Bus. 
Machines  
Interpublic Group  
 
J 
Jabil Circuit  
 
L 
Lam Research  
Leggett & Platt  
Lennar Corp.  
 
M 
Macy’s Inc.  
MasterCard Inc.  
McKesson Corp.  
Medtronic Inc.  
Micron Technology  
Mohawk Industries  
Motorola Solutions Inc.  
 
N 
Newfield Exploration Co 
Nordstrom  
Northeast Utilities 
 
O 
Omnicom Group  
 
P 
PACCAR Inc.  
Pioneer Natural Resources  
Pitney-Bowes  
Polo Ralph Lauren Corp.  
Precision Castparts  
Priceline.com Inc.  
 
Q 
QEP Resources  
 
R 
Red Hat Inc.  
Ross Stores  
 
S 
SanDisk Corporation  
Southwestern Energy  
Starbucks Corp.  
Starwood Hotels & 
Resorts  
Sysco Corp.  
 
T 
Thermo Fisher Scientific  
Tyson Foods  
 
U 
Union Pacific  
United Parcel Service  
 
V 
Verizon Communications  
Vulcan Materials  
 
W 
Walgreen Co.  
Western Union Co.  
Whole Foods Market  
Wisconsin Energy Corp.  
 
X 
Xcel Energy Inc. 
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Appendix 2 – EViews outputs of CLRM assumptions 
 
Model 3.1 Jarque-Bera test  
0
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-0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2009 2013
Observations 384
Mean       2.65e-16
Median   0.022572
Maximum  2.625313
Minimum -0.751679
Std. Dev.   0.275241
Skewness   2.027589
Kurtosis   23.97054
Jarque-Bera  7299.325
Probability  0.000000
 
 
Model 3.2 Jarque-Bera test 
0
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-0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2009 2013
Observations 384
Mean       3.77e-16
Median   0.015261
Maximum  2.611335
Minimum -0.753891
Std. Dev.   0.275099
Skewness   2.006593
Kurtosis   23.54953
Jarque-Bera  7014.221
Probability  0.000000
 
Model 3.3 Jarque-Bera test 
0
40
80
120
160
200
240
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Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2009 2013
Observations 382
Mean      -2.32e-16
Median  -0.165302
Maximum  16.81227
Minimum -1.784786
Std. Dev.   1.190955
Skewness   10.63713
Kurtosis   138.5922
Jarque-Bera  299835.6
Probability  0.000000
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Model 3.4 Jarque-Bera test 
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Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2009 2013
Observations 382
Mean      -8.31e-17
Median  -0.149256
Maximum  16.77182
Minimum -1.823905
Std. Dev.   1.190115
Skewness   10.61265
Kurtosis   138.1766
Jarque-Bera  298011.2
Probability  0.000000
 
 
Model 3.5 Jarque-Bera test 
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Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2009 2013
Observations 382
Mean      -4.77e-17
Median   0.053564
Maximum  9.246812
Minimum -18.89083
Std. Dev.   1.403799
Skewness  -7.049935
Kurtosis   103.6416
Jarque-Bera  164379.9
Probability  0.000000
 
 
Model 3.6 Jarque-Bera test 
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Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2009 2013
Observations 382
Mean      -4.19e-17
Median   0.068099
Maximum  9.285140
Minimum -18.84900
Std. Dev.   1.404303
Skewness  -7.025514
Kurtosis   103.1189
Jarque-Bera  162687.9
Probability  0.000000
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Correlation Matrix  
                    
Correlation BL C_MTB C_ROA CR_CHANGE CR_DOWN CR_UP NETDISS SIZE PROF 
BL 1,000000 
        
C_MTB 0.097465 1,000000 
       
C_ROA 0.002198 - 1,000000 
      
CR_CHANGE 0.015636 0.030239 -0.036523 1,000000 
     
CR_DOWN 0.066064 -0.017728 0.006248 - 1,000000 
    
CR_UP -0.070091 -0.036354 0.014618 - -0.049065 1,000000 
   
NETDISS -0.546843 - - 0.004423 -0.013841 0.014300 1,000000 
  
SIZE 0.249803 0.164942 -0.018434 0.036754 0.007962 -0.009016 -0.098126 1,000000 
 
PROF -0.550802 -0.115085 0.041855 -0.054701 -0.067994 0.006565 0.560355 -0.260563 1,000000 
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Appendix 3 – EViews outputs of regression results  
 
Model 3.1 NetDIss Regression Change 
Dependent Variable: NETDISS   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/23/14   Time: 13:39   
Sample: 2009 2013    
Periods included: 5 
Cross-sections included: 77 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 384   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.643977 0.212529 -3.030064 0.0026 
CR_CHANGE 0.043609 0.029155 1.495777 0.1355 
SIZE 0.055026 0.018978 2.899456 0.0040 
PROF 2.464586 0.774790 3.180972 0.0016 
BL -0.375003 0.140302 -2.672829 0.0078 
     
     R-squared 0.618808    Mean dependent var 0.029375 
Adjusted R-squared 0.614785    S.D. dependent var 0.445801 
S.E. of regression 0.276690    Akaike info criterion 0.281095 
Sum squared resid 29.01516    Schwarz criterion 0.332535 
Log likelihood -48.97016    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.301498 
F-statistic 153.8125    Durbin-Watson stat 1.228884 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
Model 3.2 NetDIss Regression Up & Down  
Dependent Variable: NETDISS   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/23/14   Time: 13:26 
Sample: 2009 2013 
Periods included: 5 
Cross-sections included: 77   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 384   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.643826 0.210793 -3.054300 0.0024 
CR_UP -0.001090 0.044689 -0.024387 0.9806 
CR_DOWN 0.067726 0.040507 1.671975 0.0954 
SIZE 0.055766 0.019080 2.922735 0.0037 
PROF 2.462649 0.770982 3.194173 0.0015 
BL -0.380906 0.142981 -2.664036 0.0081 
     
     R-squared 0.619202    Mean dependent var 0.029375 
Adjusted R-squared 0.614165    S.D. dependent var 0.445801 
S.E. of regression 0.276912    Akaike info criterion 0.285269 
Sum squared resid 28.98517    Schwarz criterion 0.346998 
Log likelihood -48.77159    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.309753 
F-statistic 122.9305    Durbin-Watson stat 1.223302 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Model 3.3 MtB Regression Change  
Dependent Variable: C_MTB   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/23/14   Time: 13:47   
Sample: 2009 2013    
Periods included: 5 
Cross-sections included: 77 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 382   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -1.272473 1.449220 -0.878040 0.3805 
CR_CHANGE 0.060265 0.165190 0.364820 0.7155 
SIZE 0.161258 0.132885 1.213509 0.2257 
PROF -0.609684 0.550087 -1.108341 0.2684 
BL 0.137392 0.381606 0.360036 0.7190 
     
     R-squared 0.033681    Mean dependent var 0.243142 
Adjusted R-squared 0.023428    S.D. dependent var 1.211533 
S.E. of regression 1.197257    Akaike info criterion 3.210945 
Sum squared resid 540.4007    Schwarz criterion 3.262587 
Log likelihood -608.2906    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.231433 
F-statistic 3.285079    Durbin-Watson stat 1.213765 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.011520    
     
      
Model 3.4 MtB Regression Up & Down  
Dependent Variable: C_MTB   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/23/14   Time: 13:44   
Sample: 2009 2013    
Periods included: 5 
Cross-sections included: 77 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 382   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -1.222244 1.425461 -0.857438 0.3917 
CR_UP -0.121916 0.074575 -1.634805 0.0979 
CR_DOWN -0.109879 0.109693 -1.001698 0.3171 
SIZE 0.161593 0.132986 1.215112 0.2251 
PROF -0.647623 0.542694 -1.193349 0.2335 
BL 0.125614 0.380675 0.329978 0.7416 
     
     R-squared 0.035044    Mean dependent var 0.243142 
Adjusted R-squared 0.022212    S.D. dependent var 1.211533 
S.E. of regression 1.198002    Akaike info criterion 3.214770 
Sum squared resid 539.6386    Schwarz criterion 3.276740 
Log likelihood -608.0210    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.239355 
F-statistic 2.730999    Durbin-Watson stat 1.207115 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.019381    
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Model 3.5 ROA Regression Change 
Dependent Variable: C_ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/23/14   Time: 13:51   
Sample: 2009 2013    
Periods included: 5 
Cross-sections included: 77 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 382   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.144324 0.975424 -0.147961 0.8825 
CR_CHANGE -0.111694 0.181409 -0.615705 0.5385 
SIZE -0.014657 0.076152 -0.192466 0.8475 
PROF 0.649168 0.730728 0.888385 0.3749 
BL 0.216686 0.311051 0.696627 0.4865 
     
     R-squared 0.003858    Mean dependent var -0.076345 
Adjusted R-squared -0.006711    S.D. dependent var 1.406515 
S.E. of regression 1.411227    Akaike info criterion 3.539799 
Sum squared resid 750.8187    Schwarz criterion 3.591440 
Log likelihood -671.1015    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.560286 
F-statistic 0.365007    Durbin-Watson stat 1.954454 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.833515    
     
      
 
Model 3.6 ROA Regression Up & Down  
Dependent Variable: C_ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/23/14   Time: 13:49   
Sample: 2009 2013    
Periods included: 5 
Cross-sections included: 77 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 382   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.185150 0.960016 -0.192861 0.8472 
CR_UP 0.073450 0.100933 0.727712 0.4672 
CR_DOWN 0.042731 0.234672 0.182088 0.8556 
SIZE -0.015829 0.077891 -0.203225 0.8391 
PROF 0.686493 0.726648 0.944739 0.3454 
BL 0.229103 0.311376 0.735776 0.4623 
     
     R-squared 0.003144    Mean dependent var -0.076345 
Adjusted R-squared -0.010112    S.D. dependent var 1.406515 
S.E. of regression 1.413609    Akaike info criterion 3.545751 
Sum squared resid 751.3570    Schwarz criterion 3.607721 
Log likelihood -671.2384    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.570336 
F-statistic 0.237148    Durbin-Watson stat 1.960382 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.945967    
           
 
 
